Jirgas have a long history in Afghanistan. Traditionally they are the venues where Afghans have always sorted out political, social, cultural and even economic problems. Typically they are attended by all of the community leaders, tribal chiefs, elders, and so on.

The Secretariat of the Jirga has indicated that the government is expecting members of parliament, cabinet ministers, governors, members of provincial councils, the Afghan Ulema Council, at least one tribal elder from each district, 20 women leaders, 30 representatives of the nomadic peoples, business and trading representatives, and the heads of various civil society organizations, political parties and refugee societies to attend this year’s jirga. Two hundred foreign diplomats are expected to participate as well. The Afghan government is to provide the funding for the Jirga.

The agenda is to include the following discussion items: 1- Consultation on what is required to reach a permanent
peace; 2- Design of an agreement as to the framework that would satisfy the opponents; 3- Design of a mechanism
that will work for the opponents; 4- National unity plan to determine the direction of the nation as a whole.

The Afghan government is holding the peace jirga at the same time the Americans are intensifying their military offensives in southern Afghanistan. The MOD, American forces and NATO-ISAF have all announced that after Marja, they intend to go to Kandaharnext. Given that anti-government insurgents have repeatedly stated that they reject the idea of peace at this time, will the jirga be enough of an enticement to bring the insurgents around to the idea of peaceful compromise? Many Afghans have expressed doubts, including Waheed Mujda, a former member of the Taliban and now a research fellow at Kabul Center for Strategic Studies.

Waheed Muzhda, who is a native of Baghlan Province, studied Economics at Kabul University. Mr. Mujda served as the Middle East Desk officer in the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry. Prior to joining the Taliban, he was a member of Hizb-e Islami. Mr. Muzhda is the author of Afghanistan and the Five-Year Reign of the Taliban. He often appears in the Afghan and international media.

Kabul Direct: What do you expect will happen in the upcoming Jirga? Are you hopeful that it will result in peace?

Mujda: Without support, the peace jirga will not lead anywhere.

Kabul Direct: Do you think it is paradoxical for the Afghan government to try and hold a peace initiative as the international forces plan major military offensives?

Mujda: Unfortunately, peace and war are always paradoxical, and the situation in Afghanistan is no different.

In a briefing presented to the Afghan parliament, Dr. Farooq Wardak said pointed out that though the Marja offensive had been planned long before the peace jirga, given the timing of the jirga, the international community needs to make sure that the Afghan president is in accord with the military schedule.

Now President Karzai is well aware of the jirga’s potential. So I hope that he will not allow the foreign forces to take away from the potential of the jirga by continuing with the offensives without his permission. My own advice would be to suggest that we give the jirga a chance – that we stop the war until after the jirga has convened.

The important issue is that the Afghan president thinks that the solution to the Afghanistan crisis is not to use a military approach. Americans pretend to agree with this mindset. However, the Obama administration has indicated that anti-insurgency efforts and military responses need to continue in order to drive home to the Taliban their relative strength. Americans believe that the Taliban will only join the political process if they feel like they are overwhelmed.

But I believe the Americans are wrong here. A weak Taliban will not have interest in sharing power. They will never feel as weak as they did in 2001, and even then they were so weak they opted out of vying for power.

The Americans would never agree to allow Hekmatyer to send his delegations to Kabul, but then only recently the Foreign Secretary agreed to let the Hizbe Islami delegation present their peace proposals.

If the foreign forces can beat the Taliban militarily, great; If they can’t, then we have to have these sorts of negotiations. President Karzai needs to make sure that all options are open.

Kabul Direct: Do you think the Americans are only playing with the Taliban?

Mujda: I think they have been trying to play with the Taliban for a long time now. They have also tried to have negotiations with the insurgents too. The UN Special Representative, Mr. Kai Aide talked with the Taliban as well.
These talks were all held privately; and Pakistan was kept out of the information loop. When Islamabad was informed about the discussions, they responded by arresting the Taliban leaders who engaged in the negotiations. What happened next was that the Americans demonstrated that they were right next to Pakistan with respect to the arrests. To me this signals that weakening the Taliban politically as well as militarily is the plan that America wants. In other words, I believe Taliban arrests that took place in Pakistan were done in close coordination with the Americans.

Kabul Direct: Recent developments seem to show that there are widening differences between President Karzai and the Americans and even Pakistanis. Do you believe that President Karzai is becoming increasingly isolated from his American sponsors? And if so, where will this lead with respect to the negotiations?

Mujda: I think Karzai will not b able to succeed without support of the international community. Karzai alone does not have the abilitythat even the Hizb-e Islami does – to propose, for example, fifteen articles and conditions under which they could agree to peace, to come up with a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces; a program to release political prisoners and close the prisons.

Alone, President Karzai is incapable of coming upwith solutions to do any of this. With the internationals, PresidentKarzai can’t do the job. At the same time, the peace jirga will not achieve anything productive without international support.

That said, I do think the Americans are now eager to come up with some kind of arrangement that will lead to peace and stability. I think a framework will therefore be defined in this conference. I think they will, for instance, come up with a timetable for foreign forces to withdraw from Afghanistan. Some members are talking about six months; others think a year is more practicable.

Kabul Direct: What do you think of President Karzai’s broader policies in Afghanistan?

Mujda: Well our next issue in my mind is constitutional reform. In the jirga they should also discuss the weaknesses inherent in our constitution. For example we need to determine which if any of the articles contradict Sharia and then decide what to do about them.

This jirga may not be the place to achieve an understanding between the government and the armed insurgents or opposition. But it could be the venue in which to determine how to reconcile the various points of view that aren’t being fought on the battlefield.

Days ago, for example, I participated in a meeting where many of the participants were hostile toward the idea of this upcoming jirga. They claim that it is unconstitutional to host such a meeting and they blamed President Karzai for wasting everyone’s time. They said he should be focusing his efforts on reducing corruption not fantasizing about peace. Some even went so far as to suggest that maybe Karzai was using the jirga to strengthen his hold on power.

I don’t know what the real story is but I do think we need to welcome all the peace initiatives we can. A jirga could in the end, open dialogues with some of the different actors we need to be talking to.

Kabul Direct: If, as has been announced, there will not be any representatives from the Taliban or the other anti-government forces, how far can this jirga really go?

Mujda: Well, it won’t necessarily be able to come up with a framework that will satisfy the Taliban obviously, but we still have a long way to go to get an agreement between parties and communities that are willing to live in peace with each other. So there is a lot of work to be done in getting to the red lines, as I call them, the lines which if crossed will destroy the whole national unity process anyway.

Kabul Direct: Shouldn’t the National Reconciliation Law that was approved by the State have defined the framework? How will what the jirga comes up with be any more workable?

Mujda: The problem with the National Reconciliation Law is that it doesn’t clarify exactly when foreign forces will withdraw, or how and what to change with respect to the constitution. The law is also silent on other important issues as well – like the closure of foreign prisons in Afghanistan. These are the items that are on the agenda for the upcoming Jirga.

Kabul Direct: So will thegovernment then proceed to put into effect any mechanism that gets drawn up in the peace Jirga?

Mujda: Well, as I said, that depends ultimately on the capability of the Afghan government. And don’t forget, President Karzai has his own political agenda with respect to the jirga.

It is said that he will gather some 1500 people together in the jirga who he can count on to deliver to the international community the message that he would like them to hear – that is the will of the Afghan people to see the withdrawal of the foreign troops.

President Karzai, they say, will use the jirga to bolster his position versus the American agenda in Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: What do Afghans expect to get out of this jirga?

Mugda: Well, there are a lot of view points here in Afghanistan, as I mentioned. Some Afghans want the Western model of democracy. Others want to continue using Afghan traditions. For some, the main issue is the lack of human rights – what the limitations should be on, say, speech or expression. With all the viewpoints here, the jirga won’t most likely achieve a unanimous position on any of the issues under discussion.

Ending the war, however, does seem to be the one goal that all participants share.

Kabul Direct: Are you saying you are doubtful that the jirga will arrive at a general consensus?

Mugda: It is unlikely but not impossible. No one wants war to continue in Afghanistan. This means there is a great incentive to come up with something that will appease the insurgents.

Kabul Direct: Over the past few years we have often heard President Karzai asking the Taliban to stop their war against Afghanistan. But the government has never been willing to meet their pre-conditions – and vice versa. How do we get around the pre-conditions this time?

Mujda: Let me answer by way of example. When the Hizbe Islami-led delegation first began negotiating, their pre-conditation was that the foreign forces had to leave Afghanistan within six months; and that the various constitutions being proposed should be compared side by side and then a vote taken on which one was the best one for Afghanistan. But after speaking to other Afghan parties, Hizbe Islami determined that Afghans were too concerned
about what would happen if the foreign forces left before a real stability had been achieved and so they backed off on this particular pre-condition.

So, you see, in this case, the negotiations were productive. They enabled the two sides to understand the others’ point of view. Hizbe Islami surprised everyone with how flexible they were willing to be.

Kabul Direct: From what I’ve heard, Hizb-e Islami might be ready to compromise but is this true of the Taliban as well? They still seem to have a lot of foreign support. Are they really sufficiently weak in your view to want to give up their fight?

Mujda: Actually the preconditions Hizb-e Islami had are very similar to the Taliban’s pre-conditions from what I have been able to gather. My contacts in Hizb-e Islami tell me that they speak to the Taliban and that the Taliban wants what they want – namely, the withdrawal of the foreign forces.

My friends tell me that they doubt the Americans will ever leave Afghanistan. But if they do leave the problem of the insurgency will be solved, they say. Hizb-e Islami  has committed to not fighting the Taliban if this happens. And if they
are true to their word, the nation won’t descend into war after the foreigners leave.

As for now, the Taliban’s problem is that as far as they are concerned, Afghanistan is under foreign occupation. The Taliban do not trust America when it comes to Afghanistan.

I am told that if the Hizb-e Islami proposal is acceptable to both the government and the international
community, then the Taliban will agree to peace as well. They do not see any need for the mujahideen to go to war this time after the American forces leave Afghanistan.

So the situation should get better.

Kabul Direct: Are you still in touch with the Taliban here in Afghanistan? What about in Pakistan?

Mujda: I believe that speculation that the Taliban are only doing Pakistan’s bidding is wrong. I have always been skeptical of these allegations.

Pakistani forces have captured Taliban and sent them to Guantanamo after all. So I doubt the Taliban trusts Pakistan after all this – or any other country for that matter.

The Taliban cherishes its independence. This is why they refrained from participating in Pakistan’s tribal wars, for example. They also did not interfere in the decision of who should replace Baitullah Massoud.

Mullah Omer, who knows Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line, has banned the Taliban in Afghanistan from advancing Al Qaeda’s agenda. At the same time he is trying to reduce their dependence on Pakistan.

That said, Pakistan is still important to the Afghan Taliban. Where else are they going to get their injured fighters treated or get them access to basic health services? If Pakistan stopped treating the Taliban, the Taliban would be
unable to continue their war in Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: Are we getting close to achieving stable peace in Afghanistan?

Mujda: First the Americans will have to conclude that Afghanistan’s problems are in the end one ethnecity’s problems. If the that tribe is unhappy then there will not be peace. While the other ethnicities in Afghanistan do not think it is fair that their interests should be subordinate to one ethnecity’s interests, the Americans are trying to use the traditional power structures as they did in Iraq. In Afghanistan they want to replicate their success in Iraq by enlisting the tribes.

Kabul Direct: Will this work? If not, what is the solution?

Mujda: Well, after three decades of war, what do we have? A defeated empire – the Soviet Union; and after nine years, NATO is still unable to stabilize the country. So this seems to be the nature of Afghanistan.

Until and unless we see the political will to stabilize Afghanistan,internationally as well as domestically, we won’t see peace. We need a lot of players who are willing to do what it will take to bring security to this country.

COPYRIGHT KABUL DIRECT 2010

Kabul Direct: Can you describe for our readers how the Shiite-Hazara political parties came into existence in Afghanistan?

Akbari: The Shiite parties came into being at the beginning of the jihad against the Soviets. At the time Central Afghanistan had spun out of the control of the government in Kabul. The Hazara were fighting for their independence
during this period, even before the communists came. But they were still not active in any of the organized political parties.

Islamist Hazara tended to follow the Late Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran. By the time of the communist coup in Afghanistan, Central Afghans had already been uprising against the regime in
Kabul. In a period of around seven months, the Shiite leaders seized control of Central
Afghanistan. It would take the mujahideen to get the area back.

At best, however, only the City of Bamiyan was ever under the government’s control. Otherwise, Hazarajat was an autonomous area, complete with its own form of government. Kabul still tried to come in occasionally and seize control but never to any avail, really. Eventually we formed the Islamic Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan to
handle some political issues. The leader of the council, Ayathullah Behishti, was an influential figure in the region. The council was not a party, however. Rather it was composed of local leaders who would gather to come up with ways to defend Hazarajat against outside invaders and to settle disputes. Even in its articles of association, the organization listed that it was not to become a political party. The council was to limit its role to administration and its jurisdiction to
Hazrajat, where there really wasn’t any central government influence.

Kabul Direct: Why did the council resist becoming a party?

Akbari: The thinking was if it became a party, other parties would be formed to compete with it. The fear was that even
Shia outside Afghanistan would see the formation of a party as a call to compete for control of the Hazara territories in the council’s domain. While I myself was not one of the founding members of the party, I think that calling it a party in the end prevented many people from wanting to join it. As a council, however, people would see it as a part of the establishment. They could participate without having to take a political side.

Kabul Direct: Did the council have foreign support?

Akbari: Never. I never saw any foreign hand behind the council. The members were exclusively from Hazarajat and by Hazarajat I mean to say the area that extends from the north of Ghazni to the east of Oruzgan to the west of Maidanwardak, then to the east of Ghor, the south of Sare Pol, the south of Samangan, and the south of Baghlan Province. In other words, all the influential men of the entire Hazara region gathered together to form this council to maintain security for the people of Hazarajat; defend the area; and to resolve internal disputes in the community. The so-called Shiite parties on the other hand had their origins outside Afghanistan. Ours, the only non-political group was in effect the controller of Hazarajat. It was formed at the start of anti-Soviet jihad group and never had any foreign support.

Kabul Direct: Did the Shiite political parties form around the same time?

Akbari: They might have been formed around the same time but I don’t remember exactly when they came into existence. I do know that the Unity Council was the only group that started exclusively in Afghanistan. Generally, as you know, the Shiite’s center of gravity is in Tehran and the Sunnis look to Peshawar. Some ten Shiite parties formed in Tehran around this time.

Kabul Direct: Which parties specifically are you referring to?

Akbari: The Islamic Movement (Nehzat e Islami); Harakat e Islami; the Nasr Organization; Islamic power (Niroy e Islami); Islamic invitation( Dawat e Islami); and Islam Devotees (Fadieeyan e Islam). Later on, some of the
founders of the Unity Council established a party they called the Coincidence Party. This was started as a secret faction at first formed by Sheikh Nadir Mahdawi, Ayatullah Nasir Bhishti, Mohammad Karmani, and Yonous Hesari. The Coincidence Party was the only Shiite party that was established inside Afghanistan.

At first the organizers wanted to hide what they were doing as theyknew they were going against the founding vision of the council. In the end, the establishment of the Shiite parties paved the way to the pluralization of politics that we see today.

Other important political parties Abdul Ali Mazari, Founding father of Hizbe Wahdat e Islami Afghanistan included the Nasr Organization and Islamic Movement that came out of Tehran. And thus the struggle for power began in Hazarajat.

Kabul Direct: Do you think ethnic rivalries are something that is rooted inside or outside Afghanistan? And do they need foreign sources of support?

Akbari: I don’t think such rivalries are rooted outside the country. In the case of the Hazara, the rivalries spring from the competing ambitions of the community’s leaders.

First and foremost, the central regions – Hazarajat – have always felt deprived of their political rights. They were never allowed full participation in the government. So Jihad was a way the Hazara could gain some political advantage. And today we see that they are at last the owners and governors of their own territory. For decades they remained unarmed.

Then Jihad enabled them to arm themselves. Shiite political parties that formed in Tehran were used to engage Afghan Shiite in the Anti-Soviet Jihad. The end goal, though, was to bring about Islamic revolution of Afghanistan. The Hazara that served on the ruling council of Hazarajat tried to take advantage of the opportunity the jihad created. This was the context in which the Civil War occurred.

Then of course there was the ruling regime’s interference in the affairs of Hazarajat that created tension.

Kabul Direct: What type of government interference are you talking about?

Akbari: One example was that the government’s official judges and administrators never allowed the people to unite. The government acted as a force to disunify the people out of fear of an opposition. The government instead encouraged people to take sides against one another. It would then profit by demanding money for each of the fighting factions. And the sides never realized they were both being milked. The idea however was make sure people could never ally against the government.

Kabul Direct: Who was the leading player in Hazarajat during the anti-Soviet jihad?

Akbari: It was the clerics and the mullahs who first led the people in the right direction. But they were not the only players. In some areas, it was the elders who became the leading commanders. But this was a different time. Then all Afghans were united against the Soviets

Kabul Direct: You mentioned something about other mujahedin parties having been formed in Peshwar in addition to those that were formed in Tehran. Tell us about the Peshawar-based parties. How did they come into existence?

Akbari: At the time I believe that every mujahedeen leader was vying for over all control of the mujahideen. The trouble was that no one leader was able to rise above all of the others. And none of these leaders could really tolerate each other. So it was the power struggle between the mujahideen that paved the way for the establishment of the other parties. Since Afghanistan was at war, Islamists in other countries wanted to help. So they helped establish parties outside the countries to influence affairs inside Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: How would you rate the support that, say, Iran lent in this process?

Akbari: In the late 1970s, Iran hosted several of these parties. For Iran it was important as well to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. But the Iranians had a lot to do to defend themselves from Saddam Hussein during this period. Don’t forget, Iran was fighting a war with Iran that would go on from 1980 to 1988.

Iran nevertheless did as much as it could to help all seven of the major Shiite parties that formed during this period. Iran, in fact, encouraged the parties to unify. Iran thought that the Shia would be stronger if they came together. But there were too many fractious divisions to have that happen. The leaders of these parties could never agree enough to present a unified front. Nevertheless they did at least raise the profile of the community in the national consciousness.

When the Russian left Afghanistan, the Sunni parties tried to ignore the demands of the Shiite parties. This created even more divisions among the Shiites. I was a member of one of the groups that was vying for power during this time. I remember when the groups finally concluded that the seven Hazara parties should form a united front that was to go by the name of the Hizb-e Wahdat or United Party. The Nasr Organization, Jihad Guard, the Islamic Movement (Nehzat e Islami), Islamic Power, Islamic Invitation(Dawat e Islami), and Islamic United Revolution Front (Jebhe Inghelab e Mutahed Islami) all agreed to come together to form this front. The front would be centralized in Bamiyan province.

Kabul Direct: So, why were the Shiite Parties then ignored when the mujahidin government was formed in Peshawar?

Akbari: Ignoring Shiites was second nature in Afghanistan. It always has been. Ignoring the Shiites has been the case since governments existed in Afghanistan. Even after the Hazara played a key role in ousting the Soviets, the community’s interests were ignored. Perhaps this is because the Shiites’ relationship with Iran as opposed to the countries who back the Sunni parties which are closer to the West.

Since the Iranian revolution, Iran has been seen as an anti-Western power. All the aid that has flown into Afghanistan since 1979, the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran, has always been routed through Pakistan. And this is why Sunni jihadists especially in the South have gotten the bulk of the outside funding and attention. The Shiite were easy to ignore.

Kabul Direct: What did the Shiite Jihadists think of their counterparts among the Peshwar Mujahedin?

Akbari: They were critical of them. In fact, they drove the Shiites away from participating in the mujhaideen government.

Kabul Direct: And why did the Shiite Civil War break out?

Akbari: The Civil War broke out at the same time civil war broke out all over Afghanistan. The mujhaideen,
once the Soviets left, turned on each other. The mujahedin were able to gain power but they didn’t know how to wield it. They didn’t know how to run a country or how to take advantage of peace.

COPYRIGHT KABUL DIRECT 2010

Kabul Direct: A driving factor of instability in Afghanistan is presumed to be the people’s lose of confidence in the government. How did this loss of confidence come about?

Alawi: First, it is important to grasp the direct connection between confidence and stability. It is the instability that ushers in the lack of confidence and not the distrust of government that brings about the instability.

That said, the source of today’s loss of faith is rooted in history. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has always been ruled by leaders who promote the interests of their clan or tribe before the interests of the Afghan nation as a whole. This is true whether our leaders emerge out of the tribal structure, the monarchy, or even democracy as we see today. In other words, we have a society that is perpetually divided by special interests as opposed to unified by a national interest.

Then the Afghan society is plagued by illiteracy. Under the monarchy, the vast majority of the people – ninety percent – could neither read nor write. How to build a shared identity lacking when the people do not even have a basic ability to communicate with each other? Thus illiteracy also helped keep Afghans segregated into tribes and clans.

Then there is the recent history – four decades of almost continuous conflict and instability. Internal divides have been exploited by competing powers. External players as well have worked to widen the domestic divisions between Afghans.

Iran backed its coreligionists while Pakistan bolstered the groups it perceived would be most loyal to
Islamabad.

Then, in addition to having to suffer under the ethnocentricity of the regime, Afghans have to worry about the incompetence factor of their government – and arrogance Is it really any wonder we have a crisis of confidence in our
leadership here in Afghanistan?

Kabul Direct: Can you explain how the lack of confidence manifests itself in the people?

Allawi: As I mentioned, politically speaking, we are an extremely tribal society. Tribalism affects every single institution in our country. Members of one tribe never fully trust the members of another tribe even if they are members of the same department or party. The tribal divides run deep. Authorities have to reward the members of their tribe and it is this code of honor that makes way for corruption and lack of professionalism that plague all of our institutions.

Kabul Direct: What stops the government from creating a sense of trust?

Allawi: Even the worst dictator cannot simply demand that people trust him. Trust is something that even the heaviest-handed regime has to earn. In Afghanistan, we have many problems. There is the lack of a sense of unity inside the government itself. We can talk of democracy all we want to here in Afghanistan but the fact remains, we have yet to become a genuine democracy. We simply do not have the ability to create a national consensus at this point in our nation’s history. Afghans are not fooled by the government’s lip service to unity when they see the benefits of government awarded along tribal or sectarian lines.

Kabul Direct: Do you think the government trusts the Afghan public?

Allawi: Our government always makes two claims: One that its actions are consistent with Islam; Two, that its actions are democratic. The truth, however, is that our government neither Islamic nor democratic. Almost all of our high-ranking officials put personal interests above the nation’s.

Then there is the issue of incompetence. Our government is inept because our leaders do not assign responsibility based on merit but based on tribal and other affiliations.

Kabul Direct: Is winning the peoples’ trust not a primary issue for the government?

Allawi: I’m sure it is but to build a state out of a nation, people have to want to come together for a reason. In Afghanistan’s case, what is the reason to come together as a nation when we have a government that is perceived as
putting the interests of one specific group above the interests of the other groups?

Then there is the failure of our government to conform to Islam as well. Our religious leaders complain that though the government hosts jirgas from time to time the real decision making happens without input from our clerics. So even our religious leaders do not have confidence in the government.

Kabul Direct: Have outside actors had anything to do with the sense of disunity?

Allawi: Indeed, the crisis of confidence here is rooted in the regional power struggles – and in the international power struggles as well. It doesn’t take long to find the foreign roots inside many of the divisions that plague us.

Kabul Direct: Are all ethnicities in Afghanistan equally suspicious of the government or are some ethnicities more unhappy than others?

Allawi: The issue is not one of equal or unequal levels of distrust among the various groups. The issue is that our government is Pashtuncentric as opposed to Afghancentric. While not all Pashtuns support President Karzai, there is still the perception that President Karzai distributes the benefits of government disproportionately to the Pashtuns.

Kabul Direct: Is the media helping to build a sense of nation or deepening the domestic divide?

Allawi: The media could be more helpful, certainly, than it has been. One problem is the widespread illiteracy. The high rates of illiteracy mean that radio and television are the most important venues. At the moment then, the media is not being particularly helpful as most stations are organized ethnocentric and sectarian lines as well.

Kabul Direct: What happens if we don’t build a united nation?

Allawi: The outcome will be another tragedy for the Afghan people – and the world, I fear. A sense of disunity will only create more discord and conflict, and the conflicts in Afghanistan could, as we have seen before, spread beyond Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: What would you recommend the Karzai administration do in this case?

Allawi: There is no simple, fail-safe mechanism that I can suggest. But I can recommend that the administration try and raise awareness about the impact our tribal values have on our society and the harm they cause us. Afghans have to be encouraged to take an honest look at our traditions and clean house. We also need to rally our religious leaders to help people sort out what is truly Islamic and what is simply exploitative.

Kabul Direct: Finally, where do Afghans who lose trust in government end up? Do they join the insurgency?

Allawi: Of course people join the Taliban if they perceive that the government is not an effective alternative. So yes, the lack of confidence is directly correlated to our rising insecurity and destabilization.

COPYRIGHT KABUL DIRECT 2010

The agenda of the talks supposedly focused on issues of bilateral economic, agricultural, communications, public relations, and energy cooperation. But according to many analysts, the focus and main agenda of the talks should have been on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the important role Pakistan could play in solving it. Not only that, but the March US-Pakistan negotiations is important from a broader point of view. In this respect, it is useful to consider the strategic bilateral relationship in historical perspective, and how it has impacted on Afghanistan.

When Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, US president Truman welcomed the independence and this elicited a positive response from Islamabad. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan reacted to the president’s stance by committing Pakistan to friendly strategic relations with Washington. Shortly after this, Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s premier, visited the United States and was warmly welcomed there. So, this was the start of close relations between the two countries, which was followed up by strengthened economic and military ties. In 1954 Pakistan signed mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States and a year later joined Baghdad Pact or CENTA. Bilateral defense cooperation was one of the principal issues covered by these pacts. After signing these treaties, Pakistan became a vital member in the defense establishment of the CENTA or Baghdad pact and the United States increasingly considered her as a strategic partner.

However, relations quickly deteriorated. Given that Pakistan proceeded to fight three wars with India – the first just a year after Islamabad’s independence – Washington cut-offits economic and military cooperation with Pakistan, whilst also claiming that Islamabad has built strong ties with Communist China. In 1973, The United States’ froze relations with Pakistan andPakistan followed suit. But soon, Washington reversed its strategy towards Pakistan, commencing a new phase of economic and military aid for Islamabad. This was at the time Zulfeqar Ali Bhutto came to power. Although religious radicalism and tribalism dominated Pakistan, Bhutto initiated programs to secularize Pakistan. He attempted to ease Pakistan’s religious-tribal radicalism and strengthen ties with the United States.

But Gen. Ziaul Haq’s 1977 coup in Pakistan ended Bhutto’s democratization and secularization program, and brought to power a military government that promoted religious radicalism both in government and throughout Pakistani society. Along with the hegemony of a military establishment in Pakistan, from 1979 Afghanistan came under Soviets occupation. As a result, Zia’s government benefitted from a deluge of American funds channeled via Pakistan to support the Afghan Jihad and prevent Soviet hegemony in the region.

After the soviet withdrawal and the formation of a Mujahedin government, the ISI and the military establishment in Pakistan wanted to see Hizb-e Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, become the ruling party of Afghanistan. But since Hekmatyar could not form a government in Kabul, Pakistan was one of the forces supported the civil war in this country. Understandably, some analysts believe Pakistan has actively sought to prevent a strong government establishing itself in Afghanistan and that it has applied double-standard in its policies towards the country.

After the 9/11 attacks Pakistan continued its double standard until the Bush Administration demanded Musharraf either change his policy of supporting the Taliban or face serious consequences,. But following intense negotiations, since then, Pakistan changed its policies and became a supportive partner, tactically at least, in the so-called ‘War on Terror’.  She also received at least five billion USD from the United States in return for her cooperation in combating the terrorist threat. Building on these foundations, Obama’s December 2009 strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan emphasised the need to build an effective partnership with Pakistan based on mutual interests, respect and trust. This was backed up in practice by increased drone strikes in the border areas, joint operations to arrest insurgent leaders and efforts to assist in the normalisation of relations between Pakistan and India. In 2010 Senator John Kerry proposed a draft bill which requested seven and half  billion dollars over the next five years in aid to Pakistan. It was approved by the United States Senate as civilian support for Pakistan.

So, as described above, ties between Pakistan and the US since Pakistan’s independence have been based on the mutual interests of both countries. Despite having experienced ups and downs in their relations, the United States has tried to maintain Pakistan as an ally in the region. But the strategic vision of the United States notwithstanding, Pakistan has always kept ties with the Taliban and al-Qaida in some manner. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s raids on Taliban’s strongholds in the FATA areas and recent arrests of senior Taliban leadership is based, first and foremost, on the desire to secure more funds whilst pretending itis sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism and, second, the capture of Mullah Baradar (and other potentially reconcilable commanders of the Taliban) by Islamabad was most probably designed to undermine the Afghan government’s strategy of reconciling with the Taliban. Mullah Baradar was one of the main Taliban leaders interested in possible reconciliation with the Afghan government.

But the most important question is why Islamabad thinks a strong and stable government in Kabul is not for the interests of Pakistan.. Meanwhile, what were the main agreements of the Pakistani delegation to the United States about Afghanistan at the March meeting in Washington? These questions can be addressed in two forms.

First, Pakistan wanted to show its power and authority over the Taliban leadership by sending a signal to important players through its recent captures of senior Taliban leaders in its territory. Meanwhile, Islamabad wanted to send a message that they hold the key to the resolution of Afghanistan’s problems, which would thus secure them a dominant place in any potential negotiations. In other words, Pakistan wants to play the leading role in Afghanistan’s affairs as it did in 1980s during the soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Second, by starting the so-called strategic dialogue with Washington, Islamabad wanted to reconfirm its crucial role in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan is currently the focus and priority of the international community, Islamabad thinks by utilizing the Taliban as a pressure tool it can keep up the attention and flow of money from its international partners. So, finally, it seems the strategic dialogue of Pakistan with the United States is more of a symbolic step by Washington to keep Pakistan supportive of the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan. But, in any case, according to many analysts, these strategic relationships will not impact positively on Afghanistan. It is more likely that they will, in fact, have more negative effects as Pakistan continues to play its double game in dealing with the insurgency and the Karzai administration.

COPYRIGHT KABUL DIRECT 2010

The capture of the Taliban’s leading military commander, Mullah Berader in Pakistan last week was widely heralded as an important victory in the war on terror currently raging in Afghanistan.  But in addition to the hopes, Mullah Beradar’s arrest also raised questions. Why was he arrested in Pakistan in the first place?  And secondly, what does his capture really mean?

Before we try and answer these questions, we need to review Mullah Beradar’s background and how he became Mullah Omar’s deputy commander.

Berader was born in Veetmok, a village in the Dehrawood District of Urozgan in 1968, according to Interpol.  He is said to be a close relative of Mullah Omar’s, the Taliban’s supreme leader.  When the Taliban was first established in 1994, Mullah Berader was one of the four founding members.  During the group’s reign of power, 1996 to 2001, he was the organization’s deputy defense minister.

Mullah Berader became notorious in Afghanistan during this time when he was held responsible for the slaughter of Hazara in Mazar-e Sharif and then later the destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan.  However, it was only after the Taliban was removed from power in 2001, that Mullah Beradar achieved real prominence. With the group now on the lam, he emerged as leading military commander and financial planner. Mullah Beradar, unlike other Taliban players, raised his own profile by regularly appearing in the Taliban media. In 2008, for example, Al Samood famously interviewed him about the Taliban’s military strategy to recapture Kabul and he was happy to talk.

Now back to our questions: Why was he captured in Karachi of all places?

Afghan officials have long pointed the finger at Pakistan as the leading source of support of the insurgency in Afghanistan, so most Afghans were hardly surprised but they did wonder, why now.

Islamabad has always denied Afghanistan’s accusations regarding its tortuous interference in Afghanistan.  Moreover, the international community has always been very careful to resist piling on  to the accusations.  The capture of Mullah Beradar in Pakistan’s major financial center, Karachi, however, would send to lend credence to the Afghan allegations, however.  So the question is, has Pakistan suddenly come around?  There are at least two possible answers to this question.

First, Pakistan might not have had anything to do with Mullah Beradar’s capture but become involved once it was forced to by, say, the CIA who might have done everything to get to this point but actually arrest Berader.  In this scenario, Pakistan only stepped in once it became clear that there was no other choice:  Help arrest him or sacrifice the American aid on which Pakistan has become famously dependent.

The other possibility is that it was the Taliban leadership who led the Pakistani authorities to Mullah Berader.  Rumors have long been circulating that Mullah Berader was in the process of trying to negotiate some kind of peace deal.

If this is what was going on, maybe Mullah Omar was getting nervous that Mullah Beradar, with all the men under his control, could become a break-away leader if he, say, wanted to strike a deal and Mullah Omar did not (or vice versa).  Under this scenario, Mullah Omar, feeling threatened by Mullah Benader, drops a dime on his deputy commander by placing a call to his friends in the ISI to have him arrested.

Maybe this is why Mullah Omar appointed so many rival commanders in recent months – men like Mullah Agha Jan Mu’Taism, Mullah Abdullah Zakir, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rahmani and Mawlawi Abdul Kabir.  Anticipating problems with Mullah Berader, he puts these alternative commanders in place to effectively neutralize Mullah Beradar before he has him turned over to the Americans by his ISI buddies. By arranging for the arrest to be made in Pakistan, Mullah Omar can plausibly deny that he had anything to do with it, and even better, he can no doubt now guarantee his friends in the ISI who turn Mullah Berader over to the Americans billions more in the military aid that for a while there was looking like it was in jeopardy.

Regardless of which scenario really just played out in Karachi, one thing is certain about Mullah Berader’s capture. It does not mean the fight for Afghanistan is over just yet.

Amb. Eikenberry, who like Gen. McChrystal, was the top American commander from 2005 to 2007, is said to be wary of sending more troops to Afghanistan for fear it will increase as opposed to decrease the country’s dependence on the US.  Amb. Eikenberry is said to be pessimistic regarding President Karzai’s ability to build a viable state.

The two American generals have reportedly long had their differences as to how to proceed in Afghanistan.  When Amb. Eikenberry was the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal was in charge of clandestine operations. At that time, Amb. Eikenberry also opposed Gen. McChrystal’s recommendation to increase the number of combat operations. Amb. Eikenberry, then as now, believed that the increase in civilian casualties this would translate to would cause the American project to lose the popular support it needed to succeed.

The White House is said to be reconsidering Gen. McChyrstal’s surge recommendation. President Obama and his advisors are now said to be contemplating adding only 10,000 to 15,000 additional troops versus the 40,000 Gen. McChrystal has proposed.

Thomas Hegghammer, a Norwegian analyst, takes issue with the logic that reducing the US footprint will win the US support. Writing on the AfPak blog, a widely respected website, he says that, paradoxically, fewer strikes may instead increase anti-American sentiment as each individual strike will likely loom larger in the popular imagination than during continuous warfare.

A smaller U.S. presence, he goes on to warn, also risks reducing the accuracy of the so-called surgical strikes. Fewer troops on the ground will translate into a reduced ability to protect informants. This will result in fewer Afghans being willing to help pinpoint targets for US airstrikes.

Reducing America’s footprint will also not likely appease America’s enemies. “Al Qaeda has a very wide definition of occupation,” writes Hegghammer, “and would frame any U.S. military presence in the region as such.”

How necessary is it to deny Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations safe haven now that the Internet seems to have eliminated the need for physical meeting points?

The Internet may have eliminated most of the need for training camps, but websites are still not able to “allow organizations to desensitize recruits and break down their natural human barriers to the use of violence,” says Hegghammer.  “It is one thing to rant online about killing infidels, it is something else to slit their throats (which is why the 9/11 operatives practices on sheep and camels in the camps).”

David Kilcullen, a leading authority on counterinsurgency, says the White House needs to adopt a plan, and sooner rather than later.  He compares the current situation to officials standing around in front of a burning building with fireman trapped inside. “There are not enough firemen to put it out. You have to send in more or you have to leave. It is not appropriate to stand outside pontificating about not taking lightly the responsibility of sending firemen into harm’s way. Either put in enough firemen to put the fire out or get out of the house. That is my analogy of where we are. Either of those approaches could potentially work.”

Kilcullen recommends that the US “go to Karzai and say ‘We are done here’. We will be leaving in two to five years. If you do not want to left hanging from a lamppost, like Najibullah [the former Afghan president hanged in Kabul in 1996 when the Taliban took control], this is what you need to do. I think that would work.”

If the cost of adding troops is steep – figure a million dollars a year for each soldier – the cost of not finishing the job will also be high. This is the calculation, Hegghammer says, the White House needs to make. Which will be more costly, continuing the war against terrorism in Afghanistan or fighting it in the West should America leave too early and the jihadists follow the troops back home?

Malik and the rest of the village men were overjoyed at the news. They were tired by the decades of war they had just lived through, first fighting the Soviets, and then their fellow Afghans during the civil war and chaos that ensued after the Soviets pulled out. Every single villager was more than ready to buy into the news that the Taliban were in fact the soldiers of Islam they said they were. They so wanted to believe their promises they were going to finally bring peace to this war-torn country.
They could not have been more wrong. Lucky for Malik, who died two years later, he never lived to see the horror of what the Taliban really brought to Afghanistan. Never could he have imagined the depravity of their vision.
Malik and the villagers never saw the Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Islam coming. Their strange beliefs — a mixture of the harsh Salafi and Deobandi views of Islam — were nothing like the Islam they believed in and practiced. They could not have predicted that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that the Taliban would proclaim would be the most inhumane system of governance that the modern world has yet to see.
The rest of the world would not immediately grasp the horror of the Taliban either. It took the 9/11 attacks for the world to sense the danger the Taliban posed, as their friendly government hosted the al Qaeda planners who plotted and carried out the attacks, but even then the world would miss the full extent of the danger the Taliban posed.
The Taliban were quickly ousted in late 2001 and Western confidence was restored. Western weapons had disposed of any threat that the Taliban could pose. But the West, like the Hazara villagers in the mid 1990s, could not have been more mistaken. It will take more than modern weapons to dispel the Taliban.
Though the international community figured out the economic and political components of the Taliban’s appeal, they failed to appreciate the power of the Taliban’s ideology.
Unlike the Arab fighters who had gone before them to help the Afghans root out the Soviets, Western forces then occupying Afghanistan never adequately took into account local sensitivities with respect to Islam, the true source of the Taliban’s power. Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian leader of the jihad against the Soviets, made sure his Arab forces respected local traditions and asked his men not to offend their Afghan comrades by praying in a style that would not be understood by them.
Azzam understood that in order to win the battle, the men had to be united in faith. He enjoined his men to refrain from their Wahabbi and Salafi ways and instead show solidarity with the Afghans by praying with them in the local Hanafi tradition. The Arab fighters should help the Hanafi Afghans win their battle against the Soviets before they should try winning the war for their version of Islam.
The international community would have been wise to follow suit when it came time for them to enlist Afghans in their battle against the Taliban. Even though in Afghanistan’s new constitution, the Hanafi and Jafari schools of Islam are cited, the Salafi influence — never imposed — has managed to grow in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s Salafi Islam can now be seen in the suicide attacks and the spread of the Hizb ut-Tahrir inside the country.
Today, the struggle for Afghanistan cannot be won by the world’s militaries. Nor will peace negotiations eliminate the threat that intolerance poses. Nor will this threat go away with a strong leader. The ultimate battle is to recover the soul of Islam.

Mullah Mu’T asim is the son of Sayed Abdul Sattarandwasbornin 1971 – or perhaps 1968, accounts differ – into a traditional Pashtun family. He was raised in the village of Nalgham in the district of Panjwayee in southern Kandahar where he attended the local madrassas. He has told interviewers that he completed his Islamic education in Pakistan – somewhere in the Tatobi area of Pakistan, he said.

As soon as he was old enough, he enlisted in the jihad against the Soviets. Taliban sources claim that he fought alongside Mullah Omar in the Kandahar region. If these accounts are true, then he must have been fighting for the Harakat- e Enghelab-e Mujahedin, as did Mullah Omar.

In 1994, Agha Jan and Mullah Omar and several other seminary students united under the shared goal of wanting to create a just, Islamic state and founded the Taliban. At the time, the Taliban seemed like a welcome change to their fellow Afghans who would welcome any alternative to the arbitrary and corrupt governance they were experiencing under the mujahideen who had been fighting over the spoils of the country ever since the Soviets pulled out in 1989. Legend has it that Mullah Mu’Tasim was seriously injured three times in battle. Whether these injuries occurred during the jihad against the Soviets or while the Taliban was taking control of Afghanistan, it is not clear.

Prior to the Taliban takeover of the country, Mullah Agha Jan was Mullah Omar’s chief aide among his inner circle and served as the Taliban leader’s closest confidante. When the Taliban captured the Afghan capital in 1996, he was named to the position of minister of finance in the new Islamic Emirate. In late 1990s, after the Taliban had control of ninety percent of the country, Mullah Omar made him chief administrator. In late 2001, after Taliban were ousted from power, Agha Jan and his fellow Taliban disappeared from the national scene for a few years. They were now listed as enemies of what was to become the new democratic state of Afghanistan.

In 2003, however, Agha Jan and his former colleagues began to resurface. They had reconstituted and once again fighting jihad against what they saw as foreign occupiers. In this new version of the Taliban, Agha Jan was named head of the political affairs commission.

In a website interview, Agha Jan described his role. His job, he said, was to oversee the organizatoin’s political strategy to enable them to reclaim their lost territory. As part of his responsibilities, he indicated, he was tasked with establishing the necessary foreign alliances the Taliban would need to combat the American-led foreign forces that were propping up the new government. While he declined to specify who exactly these foreign alliances were, anyone’s first guess would certainly be Pakistan.

The other foreign alliance that would seem to be key to the Taliban, judging from other comments Agha Jan has made, is the group’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. On a number of occasions Agha Jan has called on Saudi Arabia to use its leadership role in the Islamic world to come to the aid of nations like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine that are currently trying to liberate themselves from foreign occupations. Agha Jan’s enthusiasm for Saudi influence in Afghanistan may, however, have caused him to be relieved of his position as the chair of the Taliban’s political commission. According to an Al Jazeera report in July, Agha Jan was replaced by a relative unknown by the name of Mullah Hafizullah Mansoor after he was caught trying to strike some kind of deal Riyadh was pushing for a peace arrangement between the Taliban and Karzai administration. While no one in the Taliban has corroborated the Al Jazeera report, other reports have suggested that he may indeed no longer be serving the organization in the same capacity as he was. But instead of having of been fired, it would appear that Agha Jan has instead been promoted.

In August 2009, a Taliban source told Kabul Direct on condition of anonymity that Agha Jan had been renamed as the chair of the all-important Quetta Shura. He was said to have replaced Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, who had been moved to head of the Taliban’s military wing. Previously, this position was occupied by Mullah Berader. Whatever Mullah Agha Jan Mu’Tasim’s current role in the Taliban might be, what is clear is that since the organization fell from power in 2001, he has designed most of the group’s political and even military strategy architecture.

Fauzia Kofi

For years she served as a charity worker in northern Afghanistan, particularly in northern Badakhshan Province. Miss Kofi was the second deputy speaker of the Afghan lower house of Parliament.  Kabul Direct interviewed Ms. Kofi in the Afghan Parliament on Oct 7, 2009.

Kabul Direct: Being a native of Badakhshan Province in northern Afghanistan, and someone who is aware of the cultural sensitivities of the people, can you tell us how it happened that anti-government forces have been able to expand their activities into northern Afghanistan?

Fouzia Kofi: Three years ago when the parliament first commenced, I brought up the subject of the increasing level of insecurity in the north with various authorities, most notably Gen. Eikenberry, the then commander of the US troops in Afghanistan.

I told him and other officials because of the strategic interests of certain countries who believe that an Afghan insurgency is in their best interests, the north will surely become unstable. Evidence of this was already clear at that time. Badakhshan shares a border with Kunar and Noristan in the east and Tajikistan in the north. Forces allied with the Taliban attack the province from their bases in Kunar and Noristan. And Hizb-e Islami sends forces our way from the north. We can also trace the insurgents in Badakhshan back to Pakistan by way of the point of entry at Shah-e Salim, the road the Mujahedin used to transport weapons and reinforcements.

We also know that the Taliban enjoys the support of the locals in both Kunduz and Baghlan. When the Taliban first entered the north during the late 1990s, the central district of Baghlan were among the first to align themselves with the Taliban. This was not entirely surprising as the locals there share a similar ideology to the Taliban. In Kunduz there is no lack of local support for the Taliban as well.

So now we see that insurgency now affects Badakhshan, Kunduz, Baghlan, and parts of Takhar. If we do not act to contain this element, soon we will see it spread to other areas in the north as well. If it gets as far as Balkh, this the Taliban will have achieved a victory of strategic importance.

Kabul Direct: Are you saying the situation is getting worse? And if so, who exactly is orchestrating this?

Fouzia Kofi: Yes, things are noticeably deteriorating. For example, for the first time I was unable to travel by car this year during Ramadan Eid due to the threats posed by both criminal and insurgent elements. Even more alarming, are the rumors that the insurgency is made possible thanks to certain elements within our government.

Kabul Direct: Regarding those who you say share the same ideology as the Taliban. Can you give me an estimate of how strong they are? And can you also comment on the criminal element?

Fouzia Kofi: In terms of sheer numbers, there are more Taliban supporters than there are criminals. Moreover, it is easier to rout the criminals as they pose a transnational threat and the danger they pose should be clear to everyone. But unfortunately, there does not seem to be sufficient will to combat either as far as the government is concerned.

Kabul Direct: Why is not the government sufficiently interested in your view?

Fouzia Kofi: Because I believe that some elements in the government simply do not have the best interests of Afghanistan as the center of their agenda. As you know, the government is compromised by those who place their interests above the nation’s.

Kabul Direct: Could we talk more about those who support the Taliban? That is, on who is the insurgency in northern Afghanistan? For example, are these people Hizb-e Islami commanders or are there other forces?

Fouzia Kofi: In both Baghlan and Kunduz, the Taliban have a lot of local support. This is because the people there are too ignorant to know better – the illiteracy rate in these provinces is very high. Many people fear modernism because of their ignorance and they lack the means to determine whether an idea they are presented with makes logical sense or doesn’t.

In other provinces of northern Afghanistan – for example, Badakhshan – there is no ethnic or tribal support for the insurgency. But we do have people who are prone to adopting radical ideas – for example, the ideology of Hizb-e Islami.

We must also remember the influence Wahhabis have had in Afghanistan, including the north. The Wahhabis came during the anti-Soviet jihad and many Afghans were exposed to this interpretation of Islam when they sought refuge in Pakistan during this time. Our youth were indoctrinated when they attended the Wahhabi or Salafi madrassas there. Our youth became captivated by the idea of participating in a global jihadist movement.  So the destabilizing elements in the north include the Hizb-e Islami, the Wahhabi indoctrinated, criminals, and of course warlord commanders from Jamiat Islami, and other Islamist parties. These are the driving forces of the insurgency in northern Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: Can you tell us more about the districts in your province where you see most of the Salafis in Badakshan?

Fouzia Kofi: As I mentioned, during the Jihad against the Soviets that began in 1979, many Afghans, including in the north, sent their boys to madrassas in Pakistan. There, over time, many of these youth became radicalized when they were exposed to Wahabbism and Salafism. The districts that seem to have the greatest numbers of people with this mindset are Argo, Ragh, Daraem, and Wardood. All you need is two people who share this thinking to connect and start their activities.

Kabul Direct: How was Salafism able to catch on so quickly when Afghanistan traditionally did not subscribe to this school? I mean, 98 percent of the population is either Hanafi Sunni or Shia. How could Salafism be succeeding when it does not really have roots in the area?

Fouzia Kofi: This is why I think Salafism and Wahabbism are not as influential in Badakshan as they have been in other provinces. But that said, it is clear that the influence is growing.

Kabul Direct: Is Salafism becoming a strategic threat in Badakhshan?

Fouzia Kofi: That is a distinct possibility. When the US and others supported jihad in Afghanistan – when it was against the Soviets – radicalism was happily allowed to grow. Now, I think we know that it was not a force that should have been greeted so warmly. One way to combat this would be to attack it at the economic level. We need to assess how joblessness and other economic factors spur the growth of radical elements in Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: Let’s talk about the recent announcement the National Directorate of Intelligence made – that Hizb-e Tehrir has been rapidly expanding in Afghanistan and has now spread to the north. What is your view?

Fouzia Kofi: Yes, there are elements trying to destabilize the north. And yes, Hizb-e Tehrir is active there. Officials always like to talk about threats. But if they know so much about this organization, how come they don’t they put a stop to it?

Kabul Direct:Didyou say that the insurgents use the Shah-e Salim route to connect to Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan?

Fouzia Kofi: Yes, Shah- e Salim is the unofficial route from Badakhshan to Pakistan. The route is used to transport food and other supplies by foot.

Kabul Direct: Give us your prediction on the way things will evolve in Afghanistan over the next five years?

Fouzia Kofi: If there is enough political will, we could expect a stable north. But the fact that the north borders central Asian and NATO supply routes are being rerouted to the north means that there are more and more elements within Afghanistan and abroad Afghanistan who would like to impede this effort. They are going to try and actively destabilize northern Afghanistan.

Khalid Farooqi is a member of Afghan parliament and the leader of Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan, a registered entity in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Khalid Farooqi

During the jihad against the Soviets, Mr. Farooqi was the deputy leader of the then Hizb-e Islami and reported to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now an insurgent leader and the commander in charge of the province of Paktia. Mr. Farqooi is a graduate of an Islamic seminary in Pakistan and has a Bachelor’s in International Law and Islamic Jurisprudence. Kabul Direct interviewed Mr. Farooqi at his residence in northwest Kabul.

Kabul Direct: What is your assessment of the current security situation in northern Afghanistan?

Khalid Farooqi: When the Taliban started attacking the NATO supply route in eastern Afghanistan, the international forces began using alternate routes in the north. Naturally, the insurgents attacked this route as well as they are determined to cut off NATO’s supply chain and create disorder. The insurgents are also eager to expand northward into Central Asia, just as they have expanded their activities into Pakistan.

Kabul Direct: What is your evidence for this?

Khalid Farooqi: Previously, the insurgents went north and east inside Afghanistan. As they grew stronger, they were able to pressure Pakistan.

Kabul Direct: Are the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban part of the same coordinated group or are they independent entities?

Khalid Farooqi:  I believe that the the  architect and head commander of the entire chain of insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan is Al Qaida. The Taliban carry out Al Qaeda’s agenda.

Kabul Direct: Are you saying that it is Al Qaeda that is the leading factor behind the insurgency?

Khalid Farooqi: Well, compared to the other players, yes, Al Qaeda is highly active.

Kabul Direct: Why do you say this?

Khali Farooqi: Even Tahir Youldashov the leader of IMU who was active in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, particularly Waziristan, wanted to send his forces to northern Afghanistan to get to Central Asia. I fear that it is not just northern Afghanistan that is now under threat but also Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Kabul Direct: In your view, who are the main runners of the insurgency in northern Afghanistan? Hizb-e Islami? Other groups?

Khalid Farooqi: As I said, Al Qaeda is the main entity. Then there are the people who have been displaced by the warlords in the where they could find safe harbor. They are vulnerable to being recruited to fight the insurgency. This is why I have long recommended we need to help return all the displaced people to a normal life. Otherwise we can assume they will end up in the insurgency. While both Karzai and Abdullah’s supporters like to use the insurgency as a political weapon against the other, there are deeper and broader issues at play here.

Kabul Direct: Who exactly are these displaced persons?

Khalid Farooqi: They are the people who were accused of aiding the Taliban. This compelled them to flee where they could find safe harbor.

Kabul Direct: Where did they flee from?

KhalidFarooqi: People came from Takhar – and from Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh and Faryab, as well.

Kabul Direct: You really feel that if only these displaced persons were properly rehabilitated they would no longer be able to be used as tools by the insurgents?

Khalid Farooqi: I think we can reasonably assume that people would not join the insurgency if they believed they could live a normal life and be treated fairly.

Kabul Direct: Let us talk about today’s Hizb- e Islami. I understand that Hizb-e Islami has always attracted people from all of Afghanistan’s communities of Afghanistan, not just the Pashtuns. For example, there have even been Hazaras who identified themselves as members of Hizb-e Islami.  Is your membership still diverse?

Kahlid Farooqi: . Yes, our membership is still diverse. We have Tajik, Uzbeks and Hazaras, in addition to Pashtun among our members and senior commanders and leaders. But in the current political process, power is not distributed based on political affiliation. It is distributed based on ethnicity, which is seen as the stronger force in Afghanistan. It was the Pashtuns who were given power, after all, not the Hizb-e Islami or any another political party. Nevertheless, the Pashtuns in the government do not represent the interests of all Pashtuns.

Kabul Direct: According to press reports, the Hizb-e Islami has been actively involved in the insurgency in the north. Is this correct?

Khalid Farooqi: If there are Hizb-e Islami insurgents, they are not part of the Hizb-e Islami that is an officially recognized group. I cannot speak for those who act outside the domain of the registered entity.

Kabul Direct: Are these renegade commanders who are involved in the insurgency following orders from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar?

Khalid Farooqi: It is only natural that those who are denied their rights should struggle to gain something. I do think there might be Hizb-e Islami elements in the insurgency.

Kabul Direct: You say these people should have their rights restored and these elements should be under the attention of the government. How do you think the government can attend to these Hizb-e Islami elements?

Khalid Farooqi: Take for example the formation of the Afghan National Army. Everyone got a share but the commanders of Hizb-e Islami. During the anti-Soviet jihad, we had around 3,000 trained commanders and men and yet none of them are found in today’s army.

Kabul Direct: Why is this? Did the government reject them or did they reject the opportunity to serve in the national forces?

Khalid Farooqi: It is the fault of the government. The government should have attended to each faction.

Kabul Direct: So are you saying that all of these men have joined the insurgency because they were overlooked?

Khalid Farooqi: It is only natural that they became either become part of the political opposition or the armed insurgency.

Kabul Direct: So how do we resolve this situation?

Khalid Farooqi: We need to give them special attention. They should be given their rights.

Kabul Direct: How exactly?

Khalid Farooqi: They needed to be invited to join the government. If the communists who have the blood on their hands of all the Afghans the communists massacred can have their share of power, why not the mujahidin? They sacrificed their own blood to save this country – and from the communists no less.

Kabul Direct: What else do you recommend as the way forward?

Khalid Farooqi: Well, they are many ways. When I am talking about Hizb-e Islami, I am talking about Tajiks, Uzbiks and Hazaras, not only Pashtons.

Kabul Direct: Is Hizb-e Islami ready to begin peace negotiations?

Khalid Farooqi: The first step would be to remove all Afghans from the black list. Second, they must be given their political rights. They need to be given a share in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. They cannot be asked to just come to the government and abandon their weapons. They will not join the government if this is the invitation. They need to be negotiated with as a power. When we fought the Soviets, they repeatedly asked that we lay down our weapons and join them but we never accepted their invitation.

Kabul Direct: You yourself have witnessed that the so-called black list is now down to 100 people. But there has not been the proportional decline in the insurgency that you are suggesting would occur were this list eliminated.

Khalid Farooqi: You will only see a decline when there are no Afghans whatsoever on this list. There is no Afghan that is a terrorist.

Kabul Direct: What if the insurgents do not come to the negotiations table?

Khalid Farooqi: If the government does all this and the insurgents still will not accept the invitation for peace then the people will know that the government did everything possible to get to the peace table.

Kabul Direct: The insurgents have said they will only come to negotiations after the foreign forces leave Afghanistan. Do you believe that the foreign forces should leave in

order to get the insurgents to the table?

Khalid Farooqi: No. Negotiations should take place without such preconditions. Neither side should insist on preconditions. All Afghans must be engaged in this process.

Kabul Direct: President Karzai has already asked for negotiations without preconditions.

Khalid Farooqi: I repeat, the blacklist must be abandoned. Prisoners on both sides should be freed. Both sides must be able to trust each other.

Kabul Direct: If the blacklist is gone, will Hekmatyar participate in peace negotiations?

Khalid Farooqi: If the blacklist is gone and people still refuse to negotiate peace then the Afghan government needs to take a position against them.

Kabul Direct: But since 2006 there have been numbers of reports that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and those who follow him inside Hizb-e Islami have joined the Taliban’s fight against the Afghan government. Are these reports correct?

Khalid Farooqi: Until I see evidence that shows these claims to be true I would not rely on these reports as anything other than propaganda.

Then the president must be free of communitarian, sectarian, regional, and international influence. No special interests should be higher than the interests of the nation as a whole.

Why was I able to travel throughout Afghanistan during the campaign without the coterie of security that politicians are usually forced to travel with? It was because I am known to be independent and unattached to anyone’s agenda. We have to build a strong economy in Afghanistan. And we have to be honest with the international community. Karzai needs to choose his friends. He cannot have both President AhmadiNejad and President Obama as his personal friends at the same time.

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