Caught in the Middle: Afghanistan and the US-Pakistani Strategic Partnership
On March 24, Washington hosted a strategic dialogue and negotiations between Pakistan and the United States. The Pakistani delegation included foreign mi
nister Shah Mehmood Quraishi, chief of staff of the Army Gen. Ishfaq Kiani, ISI chief Shoja Padshah, and defense minister Ahmad Mukhtar. The US delegation included the secretary of state, secretary of defense, chief of staff of the army and other senior officials.
The agenda of the talks supposedly focused on issues of bilateral economic, agricultural, communications, public relations, and energy cooperation. But according to many analysts, the focus and main agenda of the talks should have been on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the important role Pakistan could play in solving it. Not only that, but the March US-Pakistan negotiations is important from a broader point of view. In this respect, it is useful to consider the strategic bilateral relationship in historical perspective, and how it has impacted on Afghanistan.
When Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, US president Truman welcomed the independence and this elicited a positive response from Islamabad. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan reacted to the president’s stance by committing Pakistan to friendly strategic relations with Washington. Shortly after this, Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s premier, visited the United States and was warmly welcomed there. So, this was the start of close relations between the two countries, which was followed up by strengthened economic and military ties. In 1954 Pakistan signed mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States and a year later joined Baghdad Pact or CENTA. Bilateral defense cooperation was one of the principal issues covered by these pacts. After signing these treaties, Pakistan became a vital member in the defense establishment of the CENTA or Baghdad pact and the United States increasingly considered her as a strategic partner.
However, relations quickly deteriorated. Given that Pakistan proceeded to fight three wars with India – the first just a year after Islamabad’s independence – Washington cut-offits economic and military cooperation with Pakistan, whilst also claiming that Islamabad has built strong ties with Communist China. In 1973, The United States’ froze relations with Pakistan andPakistan followed suit. But soon, Washington reversed its strategy towards Pakistan, commencing a new phase of economic and military aid for Islamabad. This was at the time Zulfeqar Ali Bhutto came to power. Although religious radicalism and tribalism dominated Pakistan, Bhutto initiated programs to secularize Pakistan. He attempted to ease Pakistan’s religious-tribal radicalism and strengthen ties with the United States.
But Gen. Ziaul Haq’s 1977 coup in Pakistan ended Bhutto’s democratization and secularization program, and brought to power a military government that promoted religious radicalism both in government and throughout Pakistani society. Along with the hegemony of a military establishment in Pakistan, from 1979 Afghanistan came under Soviets occupation. As a result, Zia’s government benefitted from a deluge of American funds channeled via Pakistan to support the Afghan Jihad and prevent Soviet hegemony in the region.
After the soviet withdrawal and the formation of a Mujahedin government, the ISI and the military establishment in Pakistan wanted to see Hizb-e Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, become the ruling party of Afghanistan. But since Hekmatyar could not form a government in Kabul, Pakistan was one of the forces supported the civil war in this country. Understandably, some analysts believe Pakistan has actively sought to prevent a strong government establishing itself in Afghanistan and that it has applied double-standard in its policies towards the country.
After the 9/11 attacks Pakistan continued its double standard until the Bush Administration demanded Musharraf either change his policy of supporting the Taliban or face serious consequences,. But following intense negotiations, since then, Pakistan changed its policies and became a supportive partner, tactically at least, in the so-called ‘War on Terror’. She also received at least five billion USD from the United States in return for her cooperation in combating the terrorist threat. Building on these foundations, Obama’s December 2009 strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan emphasised the need to build an effective partnership with Pakistan based on mutual interests, respect and trust. This was backed up in practice by increased drone strikes in the border areas, joint operations to arrest insurgent leaders and efforts to assist in the normalisation of relations between Pakistan and India. In 2010 Senator John Kerry proposed a draft bill which requested seven and half billion dollars over the next five years in aid to Pakistan. It was approved by the United States Senate as civilian support for Pakistan.
So, as described above, ties between Pakistan and the US since Pakistan’s independence have been based on the mutual interests of both countries. Despite having experienced ups and downs in their relations, the United States has tried to maintain Pakistan as an ally in the region. But the strategic vision of the United States notwithstanding, Pakistan has always kept ties with the Taliban and al-Qaida in some manner. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s raids on Taliban’s strongholds in the FATA areas and recent arrests of senior Taliban leadership is based, first and foremost, on the desire to secure more funds whilst pretending itis sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism and, second, the capture of Mullah Baradar (and other potentially reconcilable commanders of the Taliban) by Islamabad was most probably designed to undermine the Afghan government’s strategy of reconciling with the Taliban. Mullah Baradar was one of the main Taliban leaders interested in possible reconciliation with the Afghan government.
But the most important question is why Islamabad thinks a strong and stable government in Kabul is not for the interests of Pakistan.. Meanwhile, what were the main agreements of the Pakistani delegation to the United States about Afghanistan at the March meeting in Washington? These questions can be addressed in two forms.
First, Pakistan wanted to show its power and authority over the Taliban leadership by sending a signal to important players through its recent captures of senior Taliban leaders in its territory. Meanwhile, Islamabad wanted to send a message that they hold the key to the resolution of Afghanistan’s problems, which would thus secure them a dominant place in any potential negotiations. In other words, Pakistan wants to play the leading role in Afghanistan’s affairs as it did in 1980s during the soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Second, by starting the so-called strategic dialogue with Washington, Islamabad wanted to reconfirm its crucial role in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan is currently the focus and priority of the international community, Islamabad thinks by utilizing the Taliban as a pressure tool it can keep up the attention and flow of money from its international partners. So, finally, it seems the strategic dialogue of Pakistan with the United States is more of a symbolic step by Washington to keep Pakistan supportive of the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan. But, in any case, according to many analysts, these strategic relationships will not impact positively on Afghanistan. It is more likely that they will, in fact, have more negative effects as Pakistan continues to play its double game in dealing with the insurgency and the Karzai administration.
COPYRIGHT KABUL DIRECT 2010
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